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[Abstract] 
In this essay, we provide an overview of constitutional law and politics resulting from the 
historical elections in January 2016 in the light of Taiwanese political and constitutional 
development.  We take account of the new constitutional landscape opened by the 
January elections, the constitutional politics of judicial appointment, the constitutional 
controversies surrounding transitional justice and same-sex marriage, and the case law of 
the Taiwan Constitutional Court (TCC).  Taken together, we observe that constitutional 
law and politics in 2016 develops as if it is a multi-act constitutional play culminating in 
the drive towards the legalization of same-sex marriage, with President, Legislators, 
judicial nominees, and activists playing the leading roles in the unfolding drama. Though 
the TCC appears to be the bland deuteragonist in the 2016 constitutional play, we suggest 
that as the issues surrounding various reforms are being translated into constitutional 
questions, the TCC may well take center stage in the next play.  With the upcoming 
judicial fights in sight, the play of constitutional development in 2016 is best entitled 
“The Clouds Are Gathering.” 
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I.	Introduction	
Democratic election is both the fruit of and the moving force for Taiwan’s changing 
constitutional landscape.  It has been so since Taiwan set out on the metamorphosis from 
the fossilized Republic of China (ROC) regime to the present vibrant democracy in 
1980s.  While the first presidential election by popular votes in 1996 sowed the seeds of 
the transformational constitutional revision in 1997, both the presidential elections in 
2000 and 2008 resulted in “party turnover,” setting off stormy constitutional politics.  
Engaging in constitutional politics, reluctantly or not, the Taiwan Constitutional Court 
(TCC) has played a crucial role in the development of constitutional law in Taiwan.1 
2016 is no exception.  The election of the first female President, Tsai Ing-wen of the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) on January 16, 2016, brings about Taiwan’s third 
party turnover.   And, the DPP controls the Legislative Yuan (Legislature) for the first 
time in history.  With the tectonic change in the political landscape, presidential 
transition, transitional justice, same-sex marriage, and pension reform, to name just two 
pairs, are all on the reform agenda and may well impact constitutional development.  
Moreover, the coincidence of President Tsai’s taking office and the vacancy of seven 
justices of the TCC in 2016 will not only change the TCC’s composition but also bring it 
from its ten-year-long dormancy back to the center of the new constitutional dynamics set 
off by the 2016 elections and the forthcoming reforms.2  
This paper suggests that the issues arising from the new constitutional landscape opened 
by the January elections remain unsettled, paving the way for the TCC’s intervention in 																																																								
1 Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases (CUP 2003) 
106-57. 
2 Ming-Sung Kuo, ‘Moving Towards a Nominal Constitutional Court? Critical Reflections on the Shift 
from Judicial Activism to Constitutional Irrelevance in Taiwan’s Constitutional Politics’ (2016) 25 Wash 
Int’l LJ 597, 625-34, 640-41. 
		 3 
the future.  Apart from the introduction to the constitution and the TCC, Section II notes 
the constitutional politics of judicial appointment in 2016; Section III discusses the 
constitutional controversies surrounding transitional justice and same-sex marriage, 
especially the interrelationship between the politics of judicial appointment and same-sex 
marriage; Section IV summarizes the TCC case law of 2016.        
II.	The	Constitution	and	the	Court:	Past	and	Present	
Mirroring its convoluted modern history, Taiwan has been governed by an ROC 
Constitution since 1947 soon after it was placed under the China-led belligerent 
occupation following Japan’s unconditional surrender to the Allied Forces at the end of 
World War II in 1945.  The ROC Constitution was passed by a Constituent National 
Assembly (including a small delegation from Taiwan) on December 25, 1946 in China 
and came into effect a year later.  At that time, China was already engulfed in a civil war 
between the Communists and the Nationalists (also known as Kuomintang (KMT)).  To 
fight against the mounting Communist insurgency, the ruling KMT pushed through the 
“Temporary Provisions” according to the provision for constitutional amendment in May 
1948 while the first constitutional government was still taking shape.   Thus, the nascent 
ROC Constitution was essentially suspended with its add-on counter-insurgency 
Temporary Provisions further expanded.   In the meantime, a decree of regional martial-
law rule was declared for Taiwan in May 1949 when the defeated KMT forces fled to 
Taiwan.  Despite the continuing wartime status, Taiwan was placed under a four-decade-
long quasi-military dictatorship by the ROC Government afterwards.3  
Following the escalating democratic demonstrations and the parallel political reforms, 
																																																								
3 Jiunn-rong Yeh, The Constitution of Taiwan: A Contextual Analysis 28-36 (Hart 2016). 
		 4 
including the lifting of martial law in 1987, the dictatorial Temporary Provisions were 
eventually repealed in 1991.  A series of constitutional amendments have since been 
enacted in seven rounds of constitutional revision.4  The Constitution was last amended 
in 2005.  Appended to by “Additional Articles,” the original Constitution of 1947 has 
been substantially rewritten to fit with the democratic island-nation of Taiwan, only to 
leave the designation ROC unchanged.  
The TCC — initially called the Council of Grand Justices — was inaugurated in 1948 
when the ROC Government was seated in Nanjing, China.  Under the KMT-dominated 
party-state regime, the role of the TCC was substantially limited.  Yet, since the lifting of 
martial law on July 15, 1987, the TCC has transformed itself into the guardian of the 
constitutional order.5  Until the end of 2016, the TCC rendered 743 Interpretations in 
total: 216 Interpretations (including Interpretation Nos. 1 and 2 dated January 6, 1949 
when it was still seated in Nanjing) were promulgated during the 1949-87 martial-law 
rule, whereas 527 Interpretations were issued afterwards.  Despite the recent decline in 
productivity over the past decade,6 the TCC has continued to play an important role in 
constitutional politics.  
According to Articles 78 and 79 of the Constitution, the TCC has two primary functions: 
to interpret the Constitution and to unify the interpretations of statutes and ordinances.  
As its full designation connotes, the TCC gains its recent public recognition mainly 
through its jurisdiction over constitutional interpretation.  The Constitutional 
Interpretation Procedure Act of 1993 (CIPA) provides that the TCC exercises jurisdiction 
over constitutional interpretation on receiving petitions from (1) the central or local 
government agencies; (2) at least one-third of the Legislators; or (3) the people 																																																								
4 ibid 36-48. 
5 Ginsburg (n 1). 
6 Kuo (n 2) 626. 
		 5 
(individuals or corporate entities) in relation to constitutional rights.  The first two 
referral routes are similar to the “abstract norm control” procedure in the German Federal 
Constitutional Court Act.  Besides, the TCC recognizes the German-styled “concrete 
norm control” procedure in Interpretation No. 371 (1995): any judge sitting in all 
instances may suspend the proceedings before her and refer the constitutionality of the 
statute applicable to the pending case to the TCC provided that she ascertains that the 
statute is unconstitutional. 
The CIPA requires a two-thirds majority of the attending justices with a quorum of two-
thirds of the total membership to decide the constitutionality of statutes.  In contrast, a 
simple majority of those present with a quorum of two-thirds of the justices is required to 
declare an administrative regulation or a municipal ordinance unconstitutional.  As 
regards the TCC’s jurisdiction over the unification of the interpretations of statute and 
ordinances (uniform interpretations), the CIPA provides that both the government 
(central and local) and the people have standing.  Uniform interpretations can be rendered 
by a simple majority of the justices present with a reduced quorum of half of all the 
justices.  Apart from constitutional and uniform interpretations, the Additional Articles of 
the Constitution (AAC) further invests the TCC with jurisdiction over the dissolution of 
anti-constitutional political parties and the trial of the impeachment of the President and 
the Vice President.  The TCC has never been requested to adjudicate an impeachment 
case or to dissolve a political party	to date. 
Since its early days, the operation of the TCC has been modeled on the continental style 
of judicial review.  Despite the distinct referral procedures, the TCC renders 
interpretations as advisory opinions on constitutional principles or rulings on the question 
of constitutionality as well as uniform interpretations with general effect in the style of 
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“abstract review.”  The TCC traditionally conducted its business in the ambience of a 
privy council without the procedural characteristics of judicial proceedings.  Although 
the TCC has been granted the discretion to hold public oral hearings since 1993, only 
nine out of 743 interpretations were rendered following oral hearings as of 2016.   
The TCC currently comprises fifteen justices, two of whom also serve as the President 
and the Vice President of the Judicial Yuan, the administrative body of the whole 
judiciary, respectively.  The power to nominate justices is vested in the President and 
appointments are made with the consent of the Legislature.  Each justice is appointed for 
a staggered term of eight years and prohibited from serving consecutive terms (AAC, 
Article 5, Section 2). 
After President Tsai Ing-wen took office on May 20, 2016, there has been a substantial 
change in the membership of the TCC.  Five justices were scheduled to leave office on 
the completion of their eight-year term at the end of October.  In the meantime, the 
President and the Vice President of the Judicial Yuan decided to step down considering 
increased calls for their early resignation.  Thus, President Tsai nominated seven justices 
to fill the vacated seats left by former KMT President Ying-Jeou Ma’s appointees.  
During the confirmation hearings, the nominees were pressed by the Legislators to 
answer the highly controversial issues concerning the sovereignty of Taiwan and its 
relations with China in the future.  More important, a wide range of current constitutional 
issues also came to the fore in the legislative vetting.  Among them are the contentious 
issues about same-sex marriage and transitional justice.  All of the nominees were 
confirmed by the DDP-controlled Legislature despite the KMT caucus’ attempted 
obstruction.  
Notably, President Tsai nominated a former justice Professor Hsu Tzong-li, who sat on 
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the TCC bench from 2003 to 2011, to be the President of the Judicial Yuan and the chief 
justice.  From the abovementioned constitutional ban on justices serving consecutive 
terms, some commentators inferred that this nomination was unconstitutional.  However, 
doubt about the constitutionality of Hsu’s nomination was eventually deflected given that 
Hsu’s two appointments were not consecutive.  President Hsu and the other six justices 
took office on November 1 following the legislative consent on October 25.   
III.	Justice	and	Rights:	Political	Constitutionalism	in	Action	
As noted in Introduction, the results of the elections in January 2016 create tectonic 
changes in Taiwanese political landscape, giving rise to further constitutional 
controversies.  Two subjects stand out from the post-election constitutional controversies: 
transitional justice and the legalization of same-sex marriage (LSSM).   
Echoing the experience of those countries undergoing democratic transition, transitional 
justice has been one of the central themes of democratic movement in Taiwan.7  Among 
the numerous issues surrounding transitional justice is the question of the so-called “ill-
gotten party assets,” which is inseparable from the KMT’s privileged status under the 
party-state regime.  As the longtime ruling party in a virtually one-party state,8 the KMT 
has built a business empire comprising a vast real estate, companies, investments, and 
other assets since its taking control of Taiwan in 1945.  Extensive investigations have 
established that the KMT accumulated its fortunes either through favorable policies under 
the cover of law or simply by other illicit means at the expense of the State, especially 
during its uninterrupted rule from 1945 to 2000 in Taiwan.  There have been continuous 
																																																								
7 Jau-Yuan Hwang, ‘Transitional Justice in Postwar Taiwan’ in Gunter Schubert (ed), Routledge Handbook 
of Contemporary Taiwan (Routledge 2016). 
8 New parties were banned until 1987.  Before the official ban was lifted, there were only two token lawful 
political parties apart from the hegemonic KMT.   
		 8 
public calls for the restitution of those KMT-owned “ill-gotten” assets to the State coffers 
by special legislation as part of transitional justice.  As the KMT continued to control the 
parliament after it lost the presidential election in 2000, the DPP-led legislative effort to 
divest the KMT of its illicit assets was defeated time and again.  Moreover, as the KMT 
was perceived as continuing to finance its political activities with party assets, the issue 
of ill-gotten party assets became the rallying call for the rival DPP in electoral 
campaigns, including the lead-up to the 2016 elections.    
With its historical electoral victories in January 2016, the majority DPP soon in February 
introduced the legislative bill of “The Settlement of the Ill-Gotten Assets of Political 
Parties and Their Affiliates Act” (Ill-Gotten Assets Act) as part of its grand legislative 
agenda on transitional justice when the KMT still held the executive power.  Despite the 
KMT’s fierce parliamentary obstruction and street demonstrations, the bill was pushed 
through in July and came into force in August following the presidential promulgation.   
The issue of ill-gotten party assets was hardly resolved with the passage of legislation.  
As the KMT is the intended target despite the facially neutral provisions, the Ill-Gotten 
Assets Act raises complex constitutional issues surrounding transitional justice.  Before 
the “Ill-Gotten Party Assets Settlement Committee” (Settlement Committee) was 
inaugurated, the KMT caucus had made a referral to the TCC in regard to the 
constitutionality of the Ill-Gotten Assets Act even if it fell short of the CIPA-required 
procedural threshold of one-third of Legislators.9  Notably, in its referral, the KMT not 
only challenged the Ill-Gotten Assets Act but also questioned the constitutionality of the 
foregoing threshold on the grounds of its undue limitation on minority parties.  The TCC 
dismissed the referral on the procedural ground.  Nevertheless, with the Settlement 																																																								
9 A request for a constitutional interpretation needs the support of at least 38 of the Legislature’s 113 
members.  The KMT caucus has only 35 seats. 
		 9 
Committee expanding investigation and the KMT continuing to resist by legal and 
political means, the issue of ill-gotten party assets is likely to work its way up the process 
of appeal, instigating the TCC to tackle the constitutional issues surrounding transitional 
justice before long. 
 LSSM is the second front of constitutional politics opened by the 2016 elections.  
Antidiscrimination has long been on the agenda of the civil rights movement and the 
petition for the LSSM can be traced back to the mid-1980s when democratization was 
just setting out.  Yet, the same-sex marriage question did not move up the civil rights 
agenda until 2000s when several private member bills were introduced for its legalization 
in the Legislature.  Besides, individual gay couples continually filed legal challenges on 
the definition of marriage in the Civil Code in the hope that same-sex marriage would be 
legalized through statutory or constitutional interpretation, but to no avail.  In the 
meantime, social movement for antidiscrimination and gay rights continued to gain 
momentum, while concerns about the impact of same-sex marriage on family values also 
began to surface, calling for the provision for partnership instead of marriage for gay 
couples.  Afterwards the progress towards the LSSM seemed to be plateaued as the 
legislative effort was stalled in 2014. 
Thanks to the unrelenting effort of activists, the DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen 
pledged to support “marriage equality” preceding the 2016 elections.  In contrast to 
divesting the KMT of its ill-gotten party assets, however, the non-partisan LSSM issue 
was not high on Tsai Administration’s agenda in terms of the lack of consensus both 
within and without her party.   Even so, more Legislators were vociferous about the cause 
of same-sex marriage in the new Legislature than its predecessor.  Against this backdrop 
President’s TCC nomination in October presented itself as the unexpected catalyst for 
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breaking the stalemate on the LSSM.   
It was no surprise that Legislators would expect the judicial nominees to not only answer 
legal questions but also address policy issues such as the LSSM.  Yet, most of the seven 
nominees lent their support for LLSM expressly in the confirmation hearings without 
dodging it.  This was regarded as strong endorsement, breathing new life into the 
legislative drive for the LSSM.  In the meantime, the annual LGBT Pride Parade 
scheduled for October, 2016 was expected to become a popular demonstration for the 
LSSM.  In light of the shift in public opinion, new private member bills were introduced 
in the parliament.  Suddenly the same-sex marriage question topped the political agenda.   
On the other hand, this also brought about angry homophobic reactions.  A series of 
counter-demonstrations were held while rival social forces were mobilized to stem the 
tide of same-sex marriage movement.  As the private member bills were under scrutiny in 
early November, public hearings turned into violent brawls in the Legislature.  With 
public support for same-sex marriage continuing to grow, however, the focus was 
shifting from the question of legalization to how it could fit into the current legal system: 
Would special legislation governing same-sex marriage vis-à-vis the revision of the 
marriage provision in the Civil Code be another form of statutory discrimination?   
Leaving this issue unsettled, all the private member bills cleared the committee stage on 
December 26 and were referred to all party caucuses for a one-month-long compulsory 
reconciliation before it proceeds to the next stage.  Clearing the committee stage does not 
suggest that the LSSM bills will muster the support of the majority of Legislators.  It is in 
the stage of second reading at the plenary session that all important legislative issues are 
resolved.  Notably, in the meantime, two of the petitions challenging the constitutionality 
of the provisions that imply the preclusion of same-sex marriage in the Civil Code have 
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been admitted by the TCC in 2016 pending its decision.  It remains to be watched 
whether Taiwan will join the countries that recognize same-sex marriage by legislation or 
those where the judiciary has taken the lead invalidating the statutory preclusion of same-
sex marriage.10 
IV.	Remedy	and	Land:		Two	Themes	of	the	TCC	Case	Law		
Over the past decade, the TCC usually received around 450-600 new petitions annually.  
More than 90% of the petitions came from the people.  In 2016, the TCC handed out nine 
Interpretations and dismissed a total of 429 petitions.  Although the dismissed cases are 
generally done within one year of their submission, it would take the TCC three years or 
longer to reach decisions on the merits of those admitted cases.  As of the end of 2016, 
there were 375 leftover petitions pending the TCC’s decisions.11  
Among the nine Interpretations rendered in 2016, two of them are on non-constitutional, 
legal issues.  The other seven concern two main constitutional issues: judicial remedy (or 
due process of law) and land rights.  Interpretation Nos. 736, 737, 741, and 742 all 
involve judicial remedy, while Nos. 739 and 742 are on land rights.   The only exception 
to the above two categories is No. 738, which is on occupational and business freedom.  
One of the two non-constitutional/ uniform Interpretations, No. 743, also concerns the 
land rights issue, which will also be commented below. 
Judicial remedy, in light of due process of law, has been one of the TCC’s favorite issues 
over years.  Even under the authoritarian era lasting until the late 1980s, the TCC had 
																																																								
10 The TCC announced that a public hearing would be held for the two admitted pending petitions on 
March 24, 2017.  According to the CIPA and the TCC’s procedural rules on public hearing, the TCC must 
make its ruling within sixty days after hearing oral arguments.   
11  Statistics of the new and decided cases before the TCC in 2016 (in Mandarin) 
<www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/P05.asp> accessed January 31, 2017. 
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made several early successful strikes by mandating judicial remedies for civil servants, 
students, and taxpayers, among others.  By holding on to the procedural due process of 
law, the TCC has carefully and skillfully constructed a judicial forum to entertain the idea 
of the rule of law, at least in its formalistic sense, which the yet-to-be-tamed State would 
find it difficult to oppose overtly. 
Interpretation No. 737 was petitioned by a criminal defense lawyer and his client on their 
access to the evidence and relevant documents presented by public prosecutors to the 
court for the writ of pre-trail detention.  The petitioners attacked the constitutionality of 
Article 33, paragraph 1 of Criminal Procedural Act, which provides for the right of such 
access for defense attorneys during the trial stage only.  Thus, both suspects and their 
defense attorneys are excluded from such access during the pre-trial stage.  During the 
pre-trial court procedures for the writ of detention, both suspects and their defense 
attorneys are notified of the mere “facts” alleged to support the specific grounds of 
detention. 
In Interpretation No. 737, the TCC finds unconstitutional the said and other related 
provisions of Criminal Procedural Act, but still valid for up to one year or until being 
amended by the Legislature, whichever comes first.  In its reasoning, the TCC first 
emphasizes the importance of physical integrity and the right to judicial remedy as 
guaranteed by Articles 8 and 16 of the Constitution.  Considering the severity of the harm 
on the suspects inflicted by the pre-trial detention, the TCC stipulates that the principle of 
due process of law be strictly followed in the detention process.  Provision of the mere 
facts related to detention’s ground, in the opinion of the TCC, is not enough for the 
proper exercise of suspects and their attorneys’ rights to effective criminal defense.  Even 
the principle of non-publicity concerning criminal investigation procedures and the 
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prevention of the possible dangers of destroying or forging evidence and the risks of 
conspiring with co-offenders or witness could only justify the partial limitation of, but 
not the complete ban on, suspects and their attorneys’ access rights to evidence. 
Interpretation No. 737 is a decision trying to correct a long-disputed legislative defect of 
Taiwan’s criminal procedures.  It does strengthen the rights of criminal defendants and 
their right to counsel.  In the similar spirit of judicial remedy, Interpretation No. 741 aims 
to fix a procedural loophole arguably left by the TCC’s previous decisions. 
Interpretation No. 741 originated from several petitioners, whose motions for retrial were 
denied by the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) on the ground that they were not the 
petitioners of Interpretation No. 725 and therefore could not be its beneficiaries. In 
Interpretation No. 725, the TCC rules unconstitutional a court precedent of the SAC, 
which denied the motions for retrial for those cases whose applicable laws were declared 
“unconstitutional but valid for a certain period of time” until being amend by the 
Legislature.  Interpretation No. 725 overrules the said SAC precedent and demands post-
final judicial remedies (including retrial and/or extraordinary appeal) be granted to the 
petitioners.  However, Interpretation No. 725 does not expressly grant such post-final 
remedies to the petitioners of other Interpretations which also find applicable laws in 
dispute “unconstitutional but valid for a certain period of time.”  The SAC thus read 
Interpretation No. 725 in its most restrictive sense and allowed motions for retrial to the 
named petitioners of Interpretation No. 725 only.  In Interpretation No. 741, the TCC 
reiterates the intention of Interpretation No. 725 is to grant such post-final remedies to the 
petitioners of all such Interpretations which find relevant applicable laws 
“unconstitutional but valid for a certain period of time.” 
		 14 
No. 741 clarifies a long-disputed issue in Taiwan: should the courts continue to apply the 
laws found “unconstitutional but valid for a certain period of time” before their 
amendment by the Legislature?  The answer is clearly NO, after Interpretation Nos. 725 
and 741.  On the other hand, Interpretation No. 741 also illustrates the continuing tension 
between the TCC and the ordinary courts of final instance (including the SAC and the 
Supreme Court).  Since the 1980s, the final courts have been reluctant and even resistant 
to allow the post-final judicial remedies for those winning petitioners of the TCC 
Interpretations.  Over years, the TCC has taken pains to force the final courts to grant 
such extraordinary remedies, while limiting such remedies available to those winning 
petitioners only.  Other losing parties, if not filing their own petitions, of the same or 
similar cases ruled under the same applicable laws will not be granted the benefit of such 
extraordinary remedies.  In this sense, favorable decisions of the TCC will only produce 
limited retroactive effect on those parties who did actually fight their cases all the way to 
the TCC.  Such limited effect remains true even after Interpretation Nos. 725 and No. 
741.    
On the part of the land rights cases, Interpretation No. 743 stands out and deserves 
comments, too.  Despite being a non-constitutional decision, this Interpretation concerns 
a highly controversial legal issue: could a private property originally taken by the 
government for public use (e.g., the construction of the subway system) be transferred to 
another private individual or entity in the name of public interest (e.g., economic 
development)?  
Like many other countries, Taiwan governments, central and local, have been 
increasingly resorting to a variety of public-private joint ventures, such as BOT, BT and 
PPP, for the construction of public transportation and other infrastructure.  Not 
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surprisingly, the traditional requirement of taking for public use has been relaxed to 
permit taking for public interest, which is often mixed with economic development and 
private interests.  
Article 7 of Taiwan’s Mass Rapid Transit Act permits the competent authorities to take 
(expropriate) private lands adjacent to the mass rapid transit system for joint-venture 
development, and then transfer such lands to private developers.  In a station project near 
Taipei City, the local government first expropriated a large scale of adjacent lands from 
private citizens in the name of building a subway station.12  Although the government did 
make public its intended goal of joint-venture development in the future, the plan and 
details of such development were not specified and disclosed at all.  Without such 
information, those affected land owners were unable to determine whether to participate 
in the then mysterious development plan or accept the compensation for the taking of 
their lands.  This development plan then grew into a monster project disproportionately 
larger and profitable than it first appeared.  Those land owners, feeling fooled, sued for 
the revocation of the taking and the damages, among others.  As more details surfaced, 
this project turned out to be a messy political scandal. 
In Interpretation No. 743, the TCC rules in favor of those land owners, holding that the 
lands taken for public use may not be transferred to the third party (developers) for 
business purposes, unless expressly authorized by statutes and giving the affected land 
owners a prior and specific public notice of such development purpose.  As the taking of 
the lands in dispute occurred more than two decades ago, the revocation of the taking 
seems infeasible now, considering the complexity of current land ownership.  It remains 																																																								
12 In Interpretation No. 732, the TCC holds the extent of taking private lands under the Mass Rapid Transit 
Act must be confined to “what is necessary” for the specific purpose of the taking in dispute, and the 
permission of taking whatever lands considered “adjacent” is deemed excessive and unconstitutional. Both 
Interpretation Nos. 732 and 743 originated from the same development project in dispute. 
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to be watched how this case will be settled in the long run among the local government, 
the developer, and those original land owners. 
V.	Conclusion	
The development of constitutional law in 2016 is like a multi-act constitutional play 
culminating in the LSSM drive.  Democratic election, judicial appointment, and 
extrajudicial politics set the stage for this constitutional play while President, Legislators, 
judicial nominees, and activists play the leading roles in the unfolding drama.  In this 
light, the TCC appears to be the bland deuteragonist, playing the institutional supporting 
role.   Yet, as suggested above, with the issues surrounding various reforms translated 
into constitutional questions, the TCC may well take center stage in the next play.  With 
the upcoming judicial fights in sight, the play of constitutional development in 2016 is 
best entitled “The Clouds Are Gathering.”   To be continued…   
	
